Can’t Jason’s fact pattern best be analysed under principles of restitution (no juristic reason for B to receive A’s $1500).
Established principles of restitution wouldn’t allow A to claim in restitution for derivative economic loss from the unlawful wealth transfer. So the answer to Jason’s question would be no.

Kind regards,
David

Sent from my iPhone

> On Nov 2, 2019, at 10:03 AM, Gerard Sadlier <gerard.sadlier@gmail.com> wrote:
>
> To me, the case seems a clear one of breach of contract and the
> contractual test of remoteness should apply to determine the damages
> to be recovered. I don't agree that some different measure should be
> applicable because the wrong is said to have been deliberate,
> malicious, or whatever other pejorative term one uses. The fact is
> that contracts are deliberately breached every day, especially in
> commercial law without additional damages being awarded on that
> account.
>
> Kind regards
>
> Ger
>
>> On 11/1/19, Murphy, John (murphyjr) <j.murphy2@lancaster.ac.uk> wrote:
>> Dear All,
>>
>>
>> Some interesting thoughts here. But I have certain worries about some of
>> the things that have been said.
>>
>>
>> In Jason's email there was talk of the threat being an "anticipatory
>> repudiation". I have my doubts about this. In intimidation cases, the
>> threats are of the "or else" variety. But when X commits an anticipatory
>> breach, isn't the threat - effectively, "I'm telling you now that I won't
>> perform my side of the bargain" - of a qualitatively different kind? The "or
>> else" requirement in intimidation is key. It is what drives the person
>> threatened to behave in a way that the person issuing the threat desires.
>>
>>
>> In Andrew's email there was talk of an implied term that neither party will
>> do anything deliberately designed to prevent the contract being performed as
>> originally agreed. This could do the trick, but it would be difficult in
>> practice - I dare say impossible - to devise such a term that didn't
>> potentially threaten the well-established facility to vary contracts.
>>
>>
>> In Ewan's email there was the suggestion that we should take a steer from
>> the tort of deceit/fraud on the basis that fraud and intimidation involve
>> deliberate and malicious wrongs. The role of malice in tort is always a
>> prickly subject. Also, talk of deliberate wrongdoing in the context of
>> deceit is an awkward beast. Classically a false statement will suffice if it
>> were made (i) without belief in its truth, or (ii) recklessly, careless
>> whether it be true or false.
>>
>>
>> If the muddy waters of two-party intimidation are to be cleared, then it
>> seems to me that we would do well to filter out thoughts such as those above
>> given that they tend to obfuscate and complicate (rather than clarify and
>> simplify) things.
>>
>>
>> John Murphy
>>
>> From: Moshood Abdussalam <moshood.abdussalam@aut.ac.nz>
>> Sent: 01 November 2019 00:00:13
>> To: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>; Obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
>> Subject: [External Sender] RE: 2-party Intimidation and Breach of Contract
>>
>>
>> This email originated from outside of the University. Do not click links or
>> open attachments unless you recognise the sender and know the content is
>> safe.
>>
>> Hello Prof Neyers,
>>
>>
>>
>> I agree with the Supreme Court that a case of two-party intimidation (as
>> opposed to one of three-party intimidation) is simply a contractual holdup,
>> and, therefore, a breach of contract. Why should a breach of contract be
>> treated as an economic tort when unaccompanied by exceptional factors (e.g.
>> public interest concerns--as in the case of professional impropriety or
>> misconduct by one’s lawyer)?
>>
>>
>>
>> The scenario presented is surely an interesting one and arouses sympathy for
>> the victim in the issue who has lost an opportunity to earn $10,000.
>> However, in my opinion, the case calls for a bit of rethinking of Hadley v
>> Baxendale/ the remoteness rule in contract law. As I can glean from the
>> facts presented, the parties had a one-off transaction, and as such, going
>> by Hadley, the victim should have intimated the ‘intimidator’ of his
>> exposure to economic losses should a breach arise. Notice to the intimidator
>> concerning the victim’s business affairs would be a fair requirement in that
>> situation. However, if the parties have had a course of dealing over time
>> with both parties knowing each other’s business practices quite well—for
>> example, that the victim is a businessperson—then the context of dealing
>> should govern. In other words, the victim does not have to expressly or
>> implicitly bring notice to the intimidator (i.e. the promisor) of his likely
>> exposure to loss. If it would be apparent that the intimidator, at the time
>> of (contemplating) breach, should have been aware that a breach would expose
>> the victim to economic loss, then that should be enough to impose liability
>> on the intimidator for the ensuing economic loss.
>>
>>
>>
>> The remoteness rule should not be rigidly tied down to the requirement that
>> a promisee must intimate the promisor of his exposure to loss. Such a
>> requirement in ‘repeat contracting’ creates a risk of weakening the
>> bargaining position of promisees, particularly as they have to disclose
>> their affairs, and possibly trade secrets, to promisors. A course of dealing
>> between the parties, if established, should be considered as a sufficient
>> information resource available to the promisor to fix him with knowledge or
>> awareness of his victim’s likely exposure to economic loss.
>>
>>
>>
>> Regards
>>
>>
>>
>> Moshood.
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> From: Jason W Neyers <jneyers@uwo.ca>
>> Sent: Friday, 1 November 2019 2:57 AM
>> To: Obligations <obligations@uwo.ca>
>> Subject: {Spam?} 2-party Intimidation and Breach of Contract
>>
>>
>>
>> Dear Colleagues:
>>
>>
>>
>> Assume that A and B have a contract for the rental of a venue for a wedding
>> reception. Hours before the reception, B threatens to lock A out unless A
>> makes an additional payment of $1500. A makes the payment, but in so doing
>> is rendered unable to invest in a valuable business opportunity that turns
>> out to be wildly successful (ie losing a profit of $10,000). Is there a way
>> for A to recover the $10,000?
>>
>>
>>
>> An action for duress would only led to a return of the $1500.
>>
>>
>>
>> An action for breach of contract would seemingly fail as the contract was
>> not actually breached (the venue was provided) and the anticipatory
>> repudiation was not accepted by A (for good reason). Even if one could argue
>> that there was a breach of some duty imposed by Bhasin v Hrynew it seems
>> likely that the damages would run afoul of the Hadley v Baxendale remoteness
>> rule.
>>
>>
>>
>> A claim in 2-party intimidation would arguably fail, at least in Canada,
>> since our Supreme Court has intimated that a threatened breach of contract
>> is not unlawful means for the tort of intimidation. Instead the court stated
>> that A should sue for breach of contract instead which would lead to no
>> recovery (see above).
>>
>>
>>
>> Does this seem right? If this is correct, and one thinks that there should
>> be recovery, what is the means of recovery? I am leaning towards thinking
>> that the SCC was wrong to suggest that breaches of contract can never be
>> unlawful means for two-party intimidation, but am very interested in your
>> thoughts.
>>
>>
>>
>> Sincerely,
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>>
>> [esig-law]
>>
>> Jason Neyers
>> Professor of Law
>> Faculty of Law
>> Western University
>> Law Building Rm 26
>> e. jneyers@uwo.ca<mailto:jneyers@uwo.ca>
>> t. 519.661.2111 (x88435)
>>
>>
>>